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TED
BUTLER'S ARCHIVES
TED BUTLER
COMMENTARY
September 23, 2008
Time Out or About Time?
(This essay was written by silver analyst Theodore Butler, an
independent consultant. Investment Rarities does not necessarily endorse
these views, which may or may not prove to be correct.)
The unprecedented financial crises have given way to extraordinary
proposed solutions. Some leave me skeptical, such as the government
throwing unimaginable sums of money at problems, including the new $700
billion mortgage purchase scheme. Other emergency solutions seem more
straight-forward and reasonable, like the money market guarantee edict
to stem a run in that important sector.
Perhaps the most effective solution to preventing a stock market
meltdown was the order temporarily banning all types of short selling in
certain stocks, enacted by market regulators in the U.K., U.S.,
Australia, and elsewhere. Alert market observers have correctly
identified the short selling ban as the real cause behind some of the
largest rallies in stock market history. At the risk of sounding
immodest, this was exactly as I predicted and suggested.
Two months ago, in "A Modest Proposal," (http://www.investmentrarities.com/07-21-08.html)
I explained why all types of short selling should be banned and how such
a ban would result in a huge rally in the stock market. I am not so
naïve as to believe the market regulators took action based on my
proposal. It was, undoubtedly, a remarkable coincidence. But there are
some new lessons to be learned here.
The temporary elimination of both types of new short selling, namely,
naked (no borrowing of shorted shares) and covered (shorted shares
borrowed first), is an issue characterized by strongly held opinions,
both for and against. Most vocal are those against any restrictions or,
certainly, the outright banning of short sales of stock. Generally,
those complaining about the temporary ban have a vested interest of some
type. Those in favor of the temporary restrictions, including the
regulators, view it as a "time out" to prevent a stock market crash, but
to be rescinded at the first opportunity. A very few, like me, call for
stock short selling of all forms to be banned permanently
In any event, the opposing strongly-held opinions are unlikely to be
changed in the short run, so let’s agree to disagree on whether short
selling in stocks should be allowed. Let’s instead focus on fact, not
opinion.
The key fact is that both the regulators and short sellers have
learned something important this past week. What they learned was that
any restriction on short selling causes an immediate rally in stocks.
This was first learned this past summer, when temporary restrictions
were placed upon 19 financial stocks. The lesson was reinforced this
past week when short selling restrictions were placed upon 799 U.S.
financial stocks. Some day, maybe restrictions will apply to all stocks
(as it should). I don’t think this lesson for regulators and short
sellers will be forgotten any time soon.
We can argue endlessly about the merits of banning short selling.
What we can’t argue about is its effect. Do away with short selling on
some stocks, get a big rally. Do away with short selling on more stocks,
get a giant rally. Do away with short selling on all stocks and Katie,
bar the door. But still, we have only scratched the surface.
Remember, the short selling restrictions, limited and temporary as
they are, have to do with restricting new short sales. There was never
any suggestion of banning existing stock short sales and forcing short
sellers to buy back the many billions of shares previously sold short
over the years. But isn’t it inconsistent to ban new short selling and
allow old short sales to remain in force? In my opinion, a true outright
ban on new and old short sales would cause the stock market to double or
triple in a short period of time.
That thought is, or should be, running through short sellers’ heads.
Maybe it is running through the regulators’ heads as well. For the
shorts, it should be like suddenly looking into the abyss and realizing
they could face instant financial ruin if the regulators really crack
down on short selling. For regulators, it should be like suddenly
discovering the most powerful weapon ever against a stock market crash.
And it doesn’t cost a penny of taxpayer money. That meaningful
restrictions can come at some time in the future is suddenly a real
possibility. I say it’s about time.
The Sensible Swiss
This week I received an e-mail from a Swiss money manager, a friend
and trusted source. He informed me that a very large and conservative
Swiss bank had informed a number of their clients that they would no
longer be offered paper gold or silver certificates in the bank’s name.
It seems the bank had previously granted the accounts because it was
able to protect itself against an upside move with a derivatives
contract with another financial institution. Due to the financial
turmoil, the bank was no longer comfortable with the counterparty risk
from the other financial institution. Instead, the Swiss bank informed
its clients, all paper transactions had to be converted to physical or
physical ETF positions (There are Swiss ETFs for gold and silver). My
friend informed me that other Swiss banks were likely to follow this
bank’s lead.
As long-time readers know, the issue of bank silver certificates that
were not backed by real metal is one I have written about frequently
http://www.investmentrarities.com/10-01-02.html
http://www.investmentrarities.com/10-29-02.html
In essence, the banks that issued such certificates were short the
metal, and taking an enormous risk in the event of a sharp price rise.
Because they had been issued for decades, the cumulative amount of the
short position in silver amounted to, perhaps, billions of ounces. This
was a short position separate and distinct from the massive COMEX short
position.
That the large and conservative Swiss bank is seeking to reduce or
eliminate it’s short exposure to silver at this time makes sense. The
bank has seen that silver prices can move sharply higher and that
counterparty guarantees can vanish in an instant. It is sensible and
practical that it would take such actions now, after silver prices moved
sharply lower.
The resultant move by former paper owners of silver into real metal
is destined to put additional pressure on the existing supplies of
metal. It is hard to imagine a more critical time for this to occur than
now. Every indication is one of tightness in the physical silver supply.
The potential creation of a brand new source of silver physical demand
could be profound.
Raptors Revisited
About a year and a half ago, I started writing about the Raptors, the
smaller commercial traders who were developing into formidable
competitors to the T. rexes, biggest commercial traders on the COMEX.
http://www.investmentrarities.com/05-22-07.html
Since that time, the raptors have generally behaved as I wrote back
then. They have been able to buy low and sell high, becoming the most
profitable segment of traders in the futures world. They did this by
mimicking and out-maneuvering the Big 4 and 8 largest traders. Now I see
evidence that suggests a major change may be developing.
The most recent Commitment of Traders Report (COT) indicated little
change in the market structure in silver for the reporting week. But a
more detailed analysis revealed a potentially significant development.
While the total commercial net short position was basically unchanged,
there was a notable shift within the commercial category. It seems the
T. rexes (Big 4) bought some 2500 contracts net, from the raptors. This
was very unusual and something I have been privately anticipating for
some time.
I am convinced that the severe sell-off in gold and silver from the
end of July was solely intended to liquidate every margined long
position holder as possible. This allowed the dealers to buy as many
futures contracts as could be bought. The big 4 and 8 commercial shorts
bought back and covered as many of their short positions as they could,
while the raptors bought and added to their long po0sitions as much as
they could. The T. rexes and raptors hunted side by side, sharing the
common food supply of liquidating margined longs.
Once the food supply of panicked leveraged longs was exhausted, the
group hunt ended. The raptors in gold and silver then held a record long
position (especially when factoring options), while the big 4 held a
reduced, but still large net short position. The only way the largest T
rexes could further reduce their short position was to turn to the only
available source of potential selling - the heavily long raptors. But
the raptors behave differently than the leveraged longs who just
liquidated on the downside. The raptors only sell on price rallies.
I think the T. rexes know this well, and they now intend to buy back
additional short positions from the raptors on the upside. I don’t think
the big 4 care much about paying higher prices to cover their short
positions, as their main concern is to buy as many contracts as
possible. Complicating matters for the big 4 is the fact that, as prices
move higher, competition will develop from outside traders motivated by
the price increases, including many who just liquidated at lower prices.
So the challenge for the big 4 is to buy as many contracts to the upside
from the raptors, before the outside buying competition kicks in.
One way to effect this would be with sudden, sharp price rallies,
intended to induce the raptors into selling, while causing new buyers to
hesitate, fearful of equally sudden price declines. This would enable
the T. rexes to buy as much as possible from the only selling source
available, the raptors. This thinking went into my suggestion last week
that we were structured for a rally of the explosive variety.
To say that the silver market is set up and has the real potential of
exploding in price is an understatement. In fact, it’s hard for me to
conceive of a single real bearish factor. And it’s not just that there
are many bullish factors present in silver as much as it is the extreme
condition of all those bullish factors. That physical supplies are as
tight as they are, at the same time the market structure is set up so
well, at such depressed prices is a wonder to me. I never thought such
conditions could exist at the same time.
Buy The Right Brand of Premium
Last week, I made the analogy of buying gas before a hurricane to
retail investors, unable to secure desired forms of silver due to
unavailability, would increasingly turn to the wholesale industry
standard of 1000 oz bars. There are clear signs that is occurring, and I
would like to add a postscript and suggestion.
The ideal way to hold 1000 oz bars of silver is through professional
storage. While I encourage all who can store silver in personal
possession to do so, that doesn’t apply to 1000 oz bars. These bars
weigh some 70 lbs., making them very difficult to even lift, to say
nothing of shipping for the purpose of purchase or sale. Besides, if one
actually takes personal delivery of these bars, please be aware that
re-assay will be required at the time of sale, necessitating added
expense and perhaps long delay in selling. Any new buyer of such a bar
would rightly insist on testing (at the seller’s expense) to insure that
the bar wasn’t tampered with. Be forewarned.
The best way to hold these bars is through professional and insured
storage. All these bars have specific serial numbers and weights, making
it easy to assure there is real silver being stored for you. Hold them
in a recognized depository (HSBC, ScotiaMocatta, Brinks. Etc.). They can
be sold without delay or re-assay, and you needn’t worry about safety,
as silver stored for you is not part of the assets of the depository.
Please refer to the many articles I have written on this topic. No need
to lug around 70 lbs bars or pay re-assay fees. |